Federal Taxation: Formal Stockholder Vote Held Controlling in Determining When a Plan of Liquidation Is Adopted Under Section 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 by unknown
FEDERAL TAXATION: FORMAL STOCKHOLDER VOTE
HELD CONTROLLING IN DETERMINING WHEN A PLAN
OF LIQUIDATION IS ADOPTED UNDER SECTION 337 OF
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1954
SECTION 337 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
if a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation and distributes
all its assets pursuant to that plan within twelve months, no gain or
loss will be attributed to it from the sale of its property within
that period.1 Of the many problems involved in the interpretation
of this section,2 one of the most perplexing has been the determina-
tion of what factors are to be considered in establishing the date
on which a plan of liquidation is adopted.3 The Tax Court of the
United States addressed itself to this question in the recent case of
City Bank of Washington.4
The stipulated facts of the City Bank case show that representa-
tives of the City Bank of Washington (City Bank) had from time to
time discussed with representatives of American Security and Trust
Company (American Security) and its affiliate, American Security
Corporation (Affiliate), the possibility of merging City Bank and
American Security. On March 25, 1959, a "Basic Memorandum
Agreement" was executed in behalf of City Bank, American Security,
and the Affiliate, under which American Security and/or the Affiliate
agreed to purchase all the assets of City Bank and to assume all its
liabilities. By April 10, 1959, an offer by the Affiliate to purchase
all the stock of City Bank had been accepted by holders of over
1 (a) Gcneral Rule.-If-
(1) a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquidation on or after June 22, 1954,
and
(2) within the 12-month period beginning on the date of adoption of such plan,
all of the assets of the corporation are distributed in complete liquidation, less assets
retained to meet claims, then no gain or loss shall be recognized to such corporation
from the sale or exchange by it of property within such 12-month period. INT. REV.
CODE oF 1954, § 337 (a).
2 For a discussion of several problems, see Bennion, Sale of Corporate Assets Under
Section 337, U. So. CAL. 1958 TAX INST. 253.
8 The adoption date is significant in determining a corporation's tax liability, not
only because it launches the twelve-month period but also because it dctermines which
sales come under the nonrecognition provision of the statute. See Pustilnik, Liquida-
tion of Closely-Held Corporations Under Section 337, 16 TAx L. REv. 255, 256-57 (1961).
438 T.C. No. 72 (Aug. 23, 1962).
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three fourths of the outstanding shares. On May 26, 1959,5 three
days before the formal vote by its stockholders approving resolutions
for the sale of the corporation's assets and the plan of voluntary
liquidation, City Bank sold certain of its United States Treasury
bonds and notes at a large net loss.6 The remainder of its assets,
however, were sold for a gain after the formal adoption of the plan,
effectuating what Bittker calls a "straddle" sale.7 In its federal in-
come tax return for the period ending May 29, 1959, City Bank
claimed a deduction in the amount of the loss sustained in the May
26 sale of the notes and bonds but did not return the gains recog-
nized in the subsequent sale of the other assets. The Commissioner
disallowed the deduction on the ground that a plan had been in-
formally adopted prior to the loss sale and that the loss as well as
the subsequent gains qualified for nonrecognition of gain or loss
under section 887 (a). Thus, in a petition for redetermination, the
court was presented with the question of when the plan of complete
liquidation of City Bank was adopted. The Tax Court, stating that
"the general intention to liquidate is not the adoption of a plan of
liquidation,"8 denied the Commissioner's contention by holding that
the date of the adoption was the date of the formal stockholder
resolution and hence City Bank was entitled to deduct its loss from
the sale of the securities.
The purpose and history of section 37 (a) play a significant part
in an analysis of the decision in the instant case. Before the adoption
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, there were three ways to
dispose of a corporate business: (1) the individual shareholders
could sell their stock; (2) the shareholders could cause the corpora-
tion to liquidate its assets in kind and then individually sell them;
or (3) the corporation could sell its assets and then distribute the
By May 26, the Affiliate not only controlled 79% of City Bank's stock directly but
also controlled 20% indirectly through an underwriting agreement. Less than 1%, was
still held by original stockholders. 38 T.C. No. 72 (Aug. 23, 1962).
a Under § 582 of the 1954 Code, which applies only to banks, net capital losses
on the sale or exchange of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness are allowed in
full against other income. In the instant case, City Bank claimed that a plan of
complete liquidation was not adopted until May 29, 1959, the date of the formal
stockholder vote, and that the sale of the bonds and notes was thus exempt from
§ 337.
7
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(1959).
8 38 T.C. No. 72 (Aug. 23, 1962).
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proceeds in liquidation. 9 Under the first two procedures, a capital
gains tax was paid only by the shareholders. However, under the
third procedure, both the sale of corporate assets before liquidation
and the subsequent distribution to the shareholders were taxable
transactions. 10 Therefore, the question of whether a transfer was a
corporate sale or merely a shareholder sale was critical in assessing a
corporation's tax liability. Out of the numerous decisions dealing
with this question, there arose-confusion, uncertainty, and a resulting
unsatisfactory dependence on formalities in arranging liquidation
sales.'1 In order to provide a definitive rule which would eliminate
the existing confusion, Congress enacted section 337.12 However, it
failed to specify how to determine when a plan is adopted, and the
aspiration for a definitive rule went unrealized.13
In an attempt to solve the problem by introducing some guides
by which an adoption date could be determined, regulations were
proposed which fixed the date of adoption of a plan as "the date on
which occurs the first step in the execution of such plan, but not
later than the date of the adoption of the resolution by the share-
holders ...."14 The proposed regulations, however, were not ac-
Gelberg, The Court Holding Cumberland Situation: Liquidation as an Incident
to Sale of Assets, N.Y.U. 13TH INST. ON FED. TAX 605 (1955).
10 A corporate tax, generally at capital gains rates, was imposed on the excess of
the proceeds of the sale over the corporation's basis of the property sold; moreover, the
shareholder was taxed in the same fashion on the excess of the proceeds of the sale
over the basis of his stock. Id. at 606.
It Compare Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), with United
States v. Cumberland Pub. Serv. Co., 338 U.S. 451 (1950). In the Court Holding case,
the corporation engaged in preliminary negotiations for the sale of its assets before
transferring them to its shareholders who then made the sale. The Court held that
the sale was in fact a corporate sale and should be taxed as such. In the Cumberland
case, however, the Court distinguished very similar facts and held that the sale of the
assets by the shareholders after transfer to them in liquidation should be considered
a shareholder sale, even though the transaction was admittedly for the purpose of
reducing taxes.
As a result, taxpayers were virtually compelled to follow the pattern of the
Cumberland case in order to avoid the double taxation, and, even in the observance
of these formalities, they were rarely confident of the outcome. See MacLean,
Taxation of Sales of Corporate Assets in the Course of Liquidation, 56 COLUM. L.
Rx~v. 641, 642 (1956). See generally Beck, Newer Methods to Avoid the Court Holding
Company Problems. Does a Case Like Westover v. Smith Eliminate the Court Holding
Company Problem?, N.Y.U. 8TH INSt. ON FED. TAX 955 (1950).
12 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 258 (1954).
23 See generally Bennion, supra note 2.
16 Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.337-2 (b), 19 Fed. Reg. 8262 (1954). The proposed regu-
lations also provided that consideration would be given to the dates of any sales of
property not ordinarily made in the conduct of business as well as to all other
relevant facts and circumstances. For an article advocating the adoption of the
approach of the proposed regulations, see Pustilnik, supra note 3.
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cepted by the Treasury Department. The regulations which were
promulgated place more emphasis on formalities by providing that
a stockholder vote is controlling in "ordinary" cases and substance
is controlling in all other cases.15 However, the regulations neither
clearly define "ordinary" cases nor specify what facts and circum-
stances are relevant in situations which are not "ordinary."
Very few cases have been decided since 1954 involving the ques-
tion of when a plan is adopted, and taken together they offer little
controlling precedent for the courts. In Virginia Ice & Freezing
Corp.16 the court held that the date of the adoption of a plan of
liquidation was the date of the formal stockholder vote even though
certain assets were sold for a loss at an earlier date.17 On the other
hand, it was held in Mountain Water Co.' that the adoption date
is dependent on the facts in each case and that a formal shareholder
vote is not necessarily controlling. 9 There seem to be no cases
holding that formal stockholder action should be controlling in all
situations nor any cases precisely defining what type of facts and
circumstances are necessary to shift the date of adoption to a date
earlier than formal stockholder action.2 0
25 "Ordinarily the date of the adoption of a plan of complete liquidation by a
corporation is the date of adoption by the shareholders of the resolution authorizing
the distribution of all the assets of the corporation . . . in redemption of all of its
stock. Where the corporation sells substantially all of its property . . . prior to the
date of adoption. by the shareholders of such resolution ... [or] where no substantial
part of the property . . . has been sold by the corporation prior to the date of
adoption by the shareholders of such resolution, the date of the adoption of the plan
of complete liquidation by such corporation is the date of adoption by the shareholders
of such resolution ... . In all other cases the date of the adoption of the plan of
liquidation shall be determined from all facts and circumstances." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.87-2 (b) (1955).
10 80 T.C. 1251 (1958).
17 "Until then there was no assurance that the recommendation of the board of
directors ... would be adopted by the stockholders." Id. at 1257.
Virginia Ice can be distinguished from the instant case in that the officers and
directors owned only about 15% of the outstanding shares at the time of the loss
sale, the other 85% being widely dispersed among twenty-six stockholders. It was
therefore much more difficult to find that a plan had been adopted, since approval by
the stockholders was not virtually certain at the date of the loss sale as it was in
City Bank. See Bittker, op. cit. supra note 7, at 298. Pustilnik, supra note 8, at 263, 295.
1 85 T.C. 418 (1960), acq., 1961-1 Cum. Bum- 4.
1" The Mountain Water case is distinguishable from the instant case in that no
liquidating resolution was ever adopted by the stockholders. Id. at 427.
2
°But see Rev. Rul. 57-140, 1957-1 CuM. BuLL. 118 which enumerates facts and
circumstances which show that there was no intention to liquidate at the time of the
loss sale.
For cases which have held that the formal date of adoption is not necessarily con-
trolling, see Whitson v. Rockwood, 190 F. Supp. 478 (D.N.D. 1960); Powell's Pontiac-
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Congressional intent should, of course, be a paramount factor in
construing any statute. However, the only clue to congressional in-
tent here is the noticeable omission in section 337 (a) of any require-
ment of formality. This omission is significant since the original
House bill did require that a sale follow the adoption of a formal
liquidation resolution by the board of directors or the stockholders
in order to qualify for nonrecognition. 21 Had Congress intended to
require that a formal plan be controlling in all cases, it would seem
that such a provision would have remained in the statute.
Within this context of uncertainty, convincing arguments can
be advanced both for and against the Tax Court construction of
section 337 (a). In deciding for the taxpayer, the court pointed out
that the Commissioner's approach "would hardly make for cer-
tainty,122 and no doubt certainty is desirable in statutory law. Since
the date of adoption launches the twelve-month period, setting the
date back might result in the failure of the corporation to completely
liquidate within the time allotted.23 The commentators, on the
other hand, were almost unanimous in their anticipation that, given
facts analogous to those in the instant case, the date of adoption of
a plan of complete liquidation would be the date of the loss sale.24
They pointed out that under the regulations, a "straddle" situation
such as presented in the instant case, should not be classified as
"ordinary," but should be considered in the category that requires
all the facts and circumstances to be examined.2 5  Indeed, this
category was seemingly included in the regulations for the specific
purpose of closing the conspicuous "straddle" loophole in the
statute.26
Cadillac, Inc. v. Gross, 5 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 977 (D.N.J. 1960); Intercounty Develop-
ment Corp., 30 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1171 (1961).
21 H.R. 8300. 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 336 (1954).
2 38 T.C. No. 72 (Aug. 23, 1962).
23 For a discussion of this point, see Editorial Note, 23 GEo. WASH. L. RV. 701,
711-12 (1955).
21 See, e.g., Bennion, supra note 2, at 258 (date of adoption may well be deemed
to be date of loss sale); Garver, Liquidations Under Section 337, 13 W. RES. L. REv.
245, 249 (1962) (would seem reasonable); MacLean, supra note 11, at 648 (a court
might well find); Editorial Note, 23 Gao. WASH. L. Rav. 701, 714 (1955) (a much more
reasonable answer to this problem). But see Paulston, How to Plan and Execute the
Sale of a Corporate Business Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, U. So. CAL.
1956 TAX INsT. 383, 419.
25See, e.g., BrraER, op. cit. supra note 7, at 292. But see Brief for Petitioner, pp.
73-74, where it is argued that the facts of the City Bank case place it in the "ordinary"
group of cases.
2G If closing the loophole were not the purpose, there is no apparent reason for the
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Since neither the decided cases, nor the legislative history, nor
even the regulations are conclusive as to congressional intent, the
ramifications of the City Bank decision should be carefully examined
in the light of general tax objectives.27 That Congress intended to
instill certainty in an area clouded by uncertainty cannot be de-
nied.28  However in weighing the advantages of certainty against
the possibility of a significant tax disortion, 29 one might well con-
clude that certainty should be sacrificed. To make formalities con-
trolling in a "straddle" sale, as the instant case appears to do, allows
a corporation both to sell appreciated assets without realizing a
taxable gain and to deduct from previously earned income losses
from the sale of depreciated assets. Such a consequence results in
an inequitable distribution of the tax burden and therefore seems
incompatible with congressional taxation objectives. 0
distinction between sales made either before or after the formal adoption and sales
made both before and after such adoption. See MacLean, supra note 11, at 644.
27Under the reasoning of this decision, a corporation will be able to arrange all
the details of liquidation, insure stockholder approval, and determine and sell its "loss"
assets shortly before a formal stockholder vote, thus obtaining recognition of its losses
without a parallel recognition of its gains.
28 See S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 49, 258 (1956).
SoSee MacLean, supra note 11, 647 8: n. 17, for a hypothetical example of a tax
distortion by a "straddle" procedure.
3o,"Whenever taxation is allowed to depend upon form, rather than substance, the
door is opened wide to distortions of the tax laws which, after all, represent the legisla-
tive judgment for an equitable distribution of the tax burden generally." Landa v.
Commissioner, 211 F.2d 46, 50 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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